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Abstract: This paper explores evolutionary debunking arguments as they arise in metaethics against moral realism and in philosophy of religion against naturalism.  Both literatures have independently grappled with the question of which beliefs one may use to respond to a potential defeater.  In this paper, I show how the literature on the argument against naturalism can help clarify and bring progress to the literature on moral realism with respect to this question.  Of note, it will become clear that the objection that the moral realist begs the question, when appealing to the truth of some of her moral beliefs, is unsuccessful. [Word Count: 100]. 
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1. Introduction
In brief, here is Alvin Plantinga’s (1993) evolutionary argument against naturalism (henceforth, ‘EAAN’).  Those who accept naturalism and evolution have a defeater for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable; this in turn gives them a defeater for all of their beliefs, including their belief in naturalism.  EAAN has undergone detailed scrutiny, with responses by Carl Ginet (1995), Branden Fitelson and Elliott Sober (1998), Jerry Fodor (2002), Ernest Sosa (2007), and many others.​[1]​
More recently, arguments similar to EAAN have garnered much attention in metaethics.  I’ll call them ‘Evolutionary Moral Debunking Arguments’ (henceforth, ‘EMDAs’).  Though they come in many forms, they all affirm that those who accept moral realism and evolution have a defeater for the belief that the processes producing their moral beliefs are reliable; this in turn gives them a defeater for all of their moral beliefs.  EMDAs are currently undergoing much detailed scrutiny, with proponents such as Sharon Street (2006), Philip Kitcher (2006), and Richard Joyce (2006); and critics such as David Copp (2008), David Enoch (2011), Selim Berker (2014), Katia Vavova (2015), and many others. 




Let ‘naturalism’ and ‘N’ denote the view that there are no supernatural beings; let ‘evolution’ and ‘E’ denote the view that humans have originated in the way described by contemporary evolutionary science; and let ‘R’ denote the proposition that human cognitive faculties are generally reliable.
The first premise of EAAN states that the probability that our cognitive faculties are generally reliable, given the truths of naturalism and evolution, is low:
(Probability Thesis): P(R/N&E) is low.​[3]​
The next premise states,
(Defeater Thesis): Anyone who accepts the Probability Thesis and N&E has a defeater for R.
If the Defeater Thesis is true, then the naturalist who accepts the Probability Thesis and N&E has a defeater for R.  She will then have a defeater for the beliefs generated by her faculties, including the belief in N itself.
	Plantinga defends the Probability Thesis by arguing for two theses in the philosophy of mind.  First, semantic epiphenomenalism – the view that beliefs do not cause our behavior in virtue of their contents – is very likely, given the physicalist picture of human beings that follows from naturalism.  Second, it is highly unlikely that evolution would select for reliable faculties, given semantic epiphenomenalism.​[4]​ If these claims are true, then P(R/N&E) is low.​[5]​ Since Plantinga’s defense of the Probability Thesis is not relevant to the connections I want to make between EAAN and the EMDAs, I will not explain it in further detail. 
More relevant is the Defeater Thesis, so I will explain its defense in more detail.  Unfortunately, general principles that might support it are subject to counterexample.  Consider,
False Principle 1: for any A and B, if one accepts both P(A/B) is low and B, then one has a defeater for A.
False Principle 2: for any B, if one accepts both P(R/B) is low and B, then one has a defeater for R (where ‘R’ is the proposition that our cognitive faculties are generally reliable).
Against False Principle 1, suppose I am dealt a hand of five cards from a fairly shuffled deck.  I accept that P(I was dealt this hand of five cards/I was dealt a hand from a fairly shuffled deck) is low and I was dealt a hand from a fairly shuffled deck, but I do not have a defeater for I was dealt this hand of five cards.  Against False Principle 2, suppose I accept that human beings are existing things and P(R/human beings are existing things) is low, since most existing things do not have reliable cognitive faculties.  However, I do not have a defeater for R.​[6]​
Instead of appealing to principles, Plantinga appeals to analogies.  Consider his well-discussed XX pill case:
You learn that a pill, called ‘XX’, destroys the cognitive reliability of ninety-five percent of those who ingest it.  You take the pill and come to believe both that I’ve ingested XX and P(R/I’ve ingested XX) is low.

Intuitively, believing those propositions gives you a defeater for R.​[7]​ Analogously, the argument goes, those who accept N&E and P(R/N&E) is low have a defeater for R.
One might object that a naturalist can gain a defeater-defeater for her defeater for R.  Despite your belief that you took XX, perhaps you can appeal to how coherent your beliefs and appearances are; you might reason that this makes it likely that you are one of the 5% who is immune to XX.  Unfortunately, while engaging in such reasoning, you would be appealing to beliefs that you already have reason to distrust.  Put another way, any potential defeater-defeater will itself already be defeated by the original defeater for R.  Similarly, the naturalist cannot block defeat by appeal to a defeater-defeater since all of her beliefs are defeated.​[8]​
	
2.2 The Conditionalization Problem
After his initial defense of EAAN, Plantinga faced a string of related objections to the Defeater Thesis.​[9]​ Suppose I believe that Alexa is fifteen-years-old and also that the probability that Alexa can solve an advanced calculus problem, given that she is fifteen, is low.  Ordinarily, this would give me a defeater for the belief that Alexa can solve the calculus problem.  However, suppose I also believe that Alexa is a mathematical genius taking advanced courses at MIT.  The probability that she can solve the problem, given that she’s a fifteen-year-old genius taking courses at MIT, is high.  In this case, I do not have a defeater.  More generally, suppose I believe Y and P(X/Y) is low; I might also believe Z and P(X/Y&Z) is high and so protect X from defeat.  
	The objection to the Defeater Thesis is stated in the following quote by Plantinga (2002):
Right, P(R/N&E) is low… is indeed true; but there are plenty of other propositions Q I believe (for example, that R holds for the vast majority of Americans, and I am an American) such that P(R/N&E&Q) is not low... Why shouldn’t I conditionalize on N&E&Q instead of just on N&E? … In conditionalizing just on N&E, you are neglecting some of the available evidence; there are plenty of propositions I believe such that R is probable with respect to their conjunctions with N&E.  But then you haven’t really given any reason at all for thinking that I have a defeater for R (223–224).

So, even though P(R/N&E) is low, the naturalist might believe some proposition Q, where P(R/N&E&Q) is high.  In fact, given that the naturalist already believes R, she could note that P(R/N&E&R) is 1, and so proclaim that R itself can protect R from defeat.  Hence, the Defeater Thesis is false.  Not everyone who accepts the Probability Thesis and N&E has a defeater for R.
 	This objection is not claiming that the naturalist can use one of her other beliefs as a defeater-defeater, which we saw is impossible.  To clarify, Plantinga introduces the notion of a defeater-deflector.​[10]​ To have a defeater-defeater for D, D must already be a defeater, which then gets defeated.  A defeater-deflector prevents D from being a defeater in the first place.  The objector of the previous paragraph is attempting to provide a defeater-deflector, not a defeater-defeater.
The success of the objection depends on the correct answer to what Plantinga calls the conditionalization problem:
Conditionalization Problem: Which beliefs B are such that if P(R/N&E&B) is high, then B prevents N&E&P(R/N&E) is low from being a defeater for R?

Put another way, which beliefs B could be a defeater-deflector for the naturalist?  One might think that we should conditionalize on all of our beliefs, allowing any of our beliefs to be a potential defeater-deflector.  However, this would allow R itself to be a defeater-deflector, which would make it impossible for one to ever have a probabilistic defeater for R.  This seems implausible.​[11]​ In the XX Pill Case, for example, it would have been illicit to use R as a defeater-deflector, even if I believed that P(R/I took XX & R is true) is high.  Plantinga (2002, 224–225) admits that he does not have a ‘complete and rigorous answer’ to the conditionalization problem, although he adds, ‘But of course it isn’t necessary to have such an answer in order to see that one does in fact have a probabilistic defeater in a given case.’ And, Plantinga thinks, he can see that the naturalist does have such a probabilistic defeater in this case.

2.3 Are Defeater-Defeaters and Defeater-Deflectors Different?
One might object that there is no interesting difference between defeater-deflectors and defeater-defeaters.  What is the theoretical usefulness of distinguishing between the two?​[12]​ Although the distinction between defeater-defeaters and defeater-deflectors is a part of Plantinga’s discussions of EAAN, none of the detractors of EAAN have put it under any pressure.  
The following two cases will help illustrate this complaint:
Defeater-Defeater Case: I am in a factory and a widget looks red to me.  I believe it is red.  The foreman walks over and says that the widgets are irradiated with red light.  I gain a defeater for my belief that the widgets are red.  After the foreman walks away, my friend, who I know to be trustworthy, informs me that the foreman likes to play tricks on first-time visitors and always falsely tells them that the widgets are irradiated with red lights.

This is a clear case in which my defeater gets a defeater-defeater; I can continue believing the widgets are red.  Compare this case with the following:
Defeater-Deflector Case: I am in a factory and a widget looks red to me.  I believe it is red.  My friend, who I know to be trustworthy, informs me ahead of time that the foreman likes to play tricks on first-time visitors and always falsely tells them that the widgets are irradiated with red lights.  The foreman then walks over and says that the widgets are irradiated with red lights.  I never gain a defeater for my belief that the widgets are red. 

In this case, my belief formed on the basis of my trustworthy friend is a defeater-deflector for the potential defeater that I might have gained on the basis of the foreman’s testimony.  What is the difference between these two cases?  It seems that whether something is a defeater-defeater or a defeater-deflector is determined only by the order in which the information is received; there is no interesting difference between them. 
To dispel this worry, consider the following cases.  The first is a revision of the XX pill case.
XX Deflector Case: All is as in the original XX pill case, except that before I took the pill, a scientist I know to be trustworthy had informed me that I am one of the 5% who is immune to the drug.  I then take XX while knowing that I am one of the immune 5% and P(R/I’ve ingested XX and I am one of the immune 5%) is high.

In this case, my belief that I am one of the immune 5% seems to be an admissible defeater-deflector for the potential defeater, I’ve ingested XX and P(R/I’ve ingested XX) is low.  The latter proposition would never gain defeating power in the first place.  Put another way, I never gain a reason to doubt R.
	Compare that case with the following:
XX Defeater-Defeater Case: All is as in the XX Deflector Case, except that I received the testimony from the scientist two hours after I had taken the pill.  I come to believe that I am one of the immune 5% and that P(R/I’ve ingested XX and I am one of the immune 5%) is high.

In this case, however, it seems that any belief resulting from the apparent testimony of the scientist is powerless in providing me with a defeater-defeater because it would be defeated by the original defeater.​[13]​ These two examples show how a belief could work as a defeater-deflector but not work as a defeater-defeater after the relevant belief gained defeating power.  This highlights an interesting difference that will be relevant to the later discussion of EMDAs.
	Let me sum up the dialectic until now.  In the case of EAAN, once R is actually defeated by (N&E)&P(R/N&E) is low, it is impossible to get a defeater-defeater for this defeater.  Any potential defeater-defeater will itself already be defeated by the defeater for R.  However, Plantinga does not rule out the possibility that the naturalist might have some belief B, such that P(R/N&E&B) is high, which may prevent N&E&P(R/N&E) is low from being a defeater for R in the first place.  In that case, the potential defeater will have been deflected by B.  Answering exactly which propositions B are admissible for this deflecting job requires answering the conditionalization problem, to which Plantinga admits that he doesn’t have a complete solution.

3. Evolutionary Moral Debunking Arguments
3.1 A Very Brief Overview of EMDAs
Presentations of EAAN have been largely uniform, with one person as its major proponent.  Presentations of EMDAs, on the other hand, have come in various forms, by proponents and detractors alike, each with their own emphases, nuances, and degrees of clarity in formulation.  In this section, I will write with broad brushstrokes, explaining some general features of EMDAs, and then providing one thread of a discussion in the EMDA literature that the EAAN literature is relevant to. 
Katia Vavova (2015) writes the following summary statement in her overview article on EMDAs:
Such arguments typically target moral realism, which holds that moral truths are independent of our moral beliefs – what is good is good whether or not we take it to be.  The thought is that just as evolutionary forces shaped our eyes and ears, so they shaped our moral beliefs – or, at least, early, proto-versions of those beliefs.  But evolutionary forces select for survival, not moral truth.  So, if realism is true, and the evolutionary story is roughly thus, then evolution has pushed our moral beliefs in directions having nothing to do with the attitude-independent moral truths (104).

From these reflections on moral realism and evolution, the proponent of the EMDA concludes, ‘We have good reason to think that our moral beliefs are probably mistaken’ (108).  Let ‘Rm’ denote the proposition that the cognitive faculties forming our basic (or noninferential) moral beliefs are generally reliable.  EMDAs affirm that Rm is likely to be false, given moral realism and evolution.
A common response to EMDAs, often called ‘the third-factor response,’ makes two claims:​[14]​
- Morality Claim
- Morality to Reliability Claim: If the Morality Claim is true, then there is a moderately high probability that Rm is true.
For example, David Enoch (2010) writes,
Assume that survival or reproductive success (or whatever else evolution ‘aims’ at) is at least somewhat good… Selective forces have shaped our normative judgments and beliefs, with the “aim” of survival or reproductive success in mind (so to speak)… But given that these are by-and-large good aims—aims that normative truths recommend—our normative beliefs have developed to be at least somewhat in line with the normative truths… Given that the evolutionary “aim” is good, the fact that our normative beliefs have been shaped by selective forces renders it far less mysterious that our normative beliefs are somewhat in line with the normative truths (430).

In other words, given that ‘survival or reproductive success is at least somewhat good’ (Morality Claim), this makes it ‘less mysterious that our normative beliefs are somewhat in line with the normative truths’ (Morality to Reliability Claim).
Other candidates for a Morality Claim are David Copp’s (2008) claim that morality is society-centered, Karl Schafer’s (2010, 477) claim that pain is bad and relations of reciprocity are good, Knut Skarsaune’s (2011, 230) claim that pain is good and pleasure is bad, Kevin Brosnan’s (2011, 60) claim that morality promotes wellbeing, and Eric Wielenberg’s (2014, 145) claim that the existence of certain cognitive faculties entails the existence of certain moral rights.  These philosophers argue that if their respective Morality Claim is true, then there’s a moderately high probability that evolutionary forces would result in Rm being true.
A number of philosophers have charged that these third-factor responses are question begging.​[15]​ It is improper, they say, to assume a claim about morality and then argue that the probability of Rm is moderately high.  For example, Katia Vavova (2015) writes,
Enoch starts by assuming that survival is good… The immediate worry is familiar: are such assumptions legitimate in this context?  We do believe that survival is good and that we have rights.  But aren’t these moral beliefs called into question by the debunker’s story? … The debunker, if she succeeds, gives us reason to think that we are probably mistaken in our moral beliefs.  In answering her, we cannot simply assume those beliefs are true (111).

She then calls third-factor responses like Enoch’s, ‘directly question-begging.’ Others concur.  Benjamin Fraser (2014) writes in response to Brosnan and Wielenberg,
But, having been presented with the [evolutionary debunking argument], we need some grounds other than our moral intuitions or judgments on which to maintain claims about the existence or nature of moral facts.  This is so regardless of how strongly such intuitions or judgments grip us, since, after all, the debunkers’ hypothesis about the function of morality predicts that we will be firmly in the grip of our moral intuitions or judgments (471, my emphasis).

The debate between third-factor responders and chargers of question begging is currently unresolved in the EMDA literature, and Vavova (2015, 111) calls it ‘the heart of the debate between the realist and the debunker.’

3.2 A Probabilistic Formulation of an EMDA
Having presented some of the dialectic in the EMDA literature, I will now formulate an EMDA that mirrors Plantinga’s probabilistic formulation of EAAN.  I will then show, in this section and the next, how some concepts discussed in the EAAN literature can help clarify the EMDA discussion. 
Let ‘MR’ stand for moral realism.  The first premise says that the probability that the cognitive faculties producing our basic moral beliefs are reliable, given evolution and moral realism, is low:
(Probability Thesism): P(Rm/E&MR) is low.​[16]​
The next premise states,
(Defeater Thesism): Anyone who accepts the Probability Thesism and E&MR has a defeater for Rm.
If the Defeater Thesism is true, then anyone who accepts the Probability Thesism and E&MR will also have a defeater for all her basic moral beliefs, which will in turn defeat the moral beliefs that are inferentially based on her basic ones.  Let ‘EMDA*’ be a proper name for the specific EMDA I have just presented.
	Given this formulation, what is the best way to understand the third-factor response?  At a minimum, the third-factor responder thinks that the probability of Rm is moderately high.  But high, conditional on what?  She could argue that P(Rm/E&MR&Morality Claim) is high.  For example, let ‘G’ denote the proposition that survival or reproductive success is a good thing.  We can take Enoch to be saying that even if P(Rm/E&MR) is low, the P(Rm/E&MR&G) is moderately high. (We can see how this probabilistic formulation of EMDA makes explicitly clear what the probability claims are conditional on.) However, even if P(Rm/E&MR&G) is moderately high, will this keep Enoch from having a defeater for Rm?  I discuss this in the following sections.

3.3 Defeating the Defeater and Epistemic Circularity
I will now discuss two related interpretations of the third-factor response and corresponding interpretations of the charge of question begging.  The first is that the Morality Claim is a defeater-defeater.  On this interpretation, the third-factor response is bound to fail.  For example, suppose Enoch admits that E&MR&P(Rm/E&MR) is low is a defeater for Rm.  He cannot then use his belief in G as a defeater-defeater, because it will itself have been defeated since Rm was defeated.  It is for this very reason that the naturalist could not wield a defeater-defeater in EAAN.  So, if the third-factor responder was trying to use as a defeater-defeater a belief that’s already defeated, and if the charge of question begging is that this is illicit, then the charge is clearly appropriate.
The second interpretation frames the dialectic in terms of epistemic circularity, which has undergone significant discussion in the EAAN literature and in mainstream epistemology.  Epistemic circularity has also been discussed in the EMDA and metaethics literature, but normally under the guise of charges of question begging.​[17]​ In the process of explaining this second interpretation, I will attempt to connect the two literatures.  Following Michael Bergman (2006, 180), let us say that S’s belief that source X is reliable is epistemically circular if S’s belief depends on X.  For example, if my belief that my memory is generally reliable depends on my memory, then this belief is epistemically circular.  Now, many epistemologists have argued that a belief’s being epistemically circular does not alone disqualify it from being justified; sometimes it does disqualify it, and sometimes it doesn’t.​[18]​ For example, consider that it seems that we justifiedly believe R, that our faculties are generally reliable.  But note that it is impossible to believe R in a noncircular way; we depend on our faculties to believe that our faculties are reliable.  So, if the initial intuition is correct – that we justifiedly believe R – then epistemic circularity does not necessarily disqualify a belief from being justified.  Following Bergmann, let circularity that disqualifies a belief from being justified be called ‘malignant circularity’; otherwise, it is called ‘benign circularity’.​[19]​
Now suppose Enoch conditionalizes on (and hence uses) his belief in G to raise the probability of Rm.  His support for Rm would then partly depend on his belief in G.  Then his belief in Rm would be epistemically circular because his belief in G would depend on deliverances of the faculties producing his basic moral beliefs.  Here now is the second interpretation of the third-factor response.  Enoch could say that it is true that Rm has a defeater.  However, he could also claim both that despite this defeater, one can use G to come to believe in Rm in an epistemically circular way, and also that this is benign circularity.  We can then interpret the charge of question begging to be that the belief in Rm is, rather, an instance of malignant circularity.
Now, if this is how are to understand the third-factor response and the charge of question begging, then the charge is correct: such circularity would be malignant.  Bergmann (2006, 198–200) has convincingly argued for the following sufficient condition for malignant circularity: if one already has a defeater for believing that X is reliable, then using a deliverance of X as one’s support for continuing to believe that X is reliable results in malignant circularity.  Put another way, if one already has a reason to doubt source X, then one cannot bootstrap one’s way out of doubting source X by relying on deliverances of X.  And on this second interpretation of the third-factor response, we are supposing that Rm already has a defeater.
We can now see that the two ways of interpreting the dialectic in this section are related.  The first interpretation attempts to use G (or another Morality Claim) as a defeater-defeater.  It fails because G is defeated by the original defeater for Rm.  The second interpretation attempts to use G (or another Morality Claim) to justify epistemically circular belief in Rm.  It fails because this results in malignant circularity.  Why is this malignant circularity?  Because Rm is already defeated.​[20]​ In both cases, the move is disallowed because Rm has a defeater.

3.4 The Defeater-Deflector Interpretation of the Third-Factor Response
Instead of thinking of the Morality Claim as a defeater-defeater, perhaps we should think of it as a defeater-deflector.​[21]​ We can take Enoch to be agreeing that P(Rm/E&MR) is low, but also saying that G is a defeater-deflector because P(Rm/E&MR&G) is high.  Put this way, we can see that the third-factor response is similar to the objections to EAAN that I presented earlier; both are trying to find a defeater-deflector.  Furthermore, although using G to support Rm might result in belief in Rm being epistemically circular, this is not the clearly malignant sort of circularity that occurs in the defeater-defeater case.  It very well could be benign circularity.  I submit that this is the best way to understand the third-factor response.
But can conditionalizing on G or any of the Morality Claims save Rm from defeat?  To answer this, we need a solution to the conditionalization problem.  Recall that it asks,
Which beliefs B are such that if P(R/N&E&B) is high, then B prevents N&E&P(R/N&E) is low from being a defeater for R?

Here is the EMDA* version,
Which beliefs B are such that if P(Rm/E&MR&B) is high, then B prevents E&MR&P(Rm/E&MR) is low from being a defeater for Rm?

As mentioned before, Plantinga admitted that he has no complete solution to the conditionalization problem.
With this understanding of the third-factor response, we can now understand the charge of question begging in a new light.  It is giving a partial answer to the conditionalization problem.  It states that it is illicit to use the Morality Claim to prevent the defeat of Rm, when belief in the Morality Claim is a deliverance of the very faculties that are in question.  More precisely,
Anti-Circularity Deflector Principle: S’s belief DD is a defeater-deflector for S’s belief that source X is reliable, from the potential defeater PD, only if DD is neither produced by X nor evidentially dependent on a belief produced by X.​[22]​
Put another way, you cannot use a proposition as a deflector if it results in epistemic circularity.  And the charger of question begging is claiming that the third-factor responder is doing just this by appealing to a Morality Claim.​[23]​
	The anti-circularity deflector principle does not imply the implausible claim that there are never instances of benign circularity.  As I mentioned earlier, most epistemologists agree that there are such cases.  Rather, it only specifies that there is malignant circularity in certain cases.  Specifically, if belief in the reliability of some source X has a potential defeater, then one cannot use any deliverance of X to deflect that potential defeater; the resulting epistemically circular belief that X is reliable is malignant in such cases.  Notice that this is not as immediately plausible as Bergmann’s sufficient condition for malignant epistemic circularity – that if belief in the reliability of source X has an actual defeater, then using a deliverance of X as one’s support for continuing to believe that X is reliable results in malignant circularity.

4. Evaluating the Anti-Circularity Deflector Principle
4.1 In Defense of the Principle
If the anti-circularity deflector principle is true, then the third-factor responder is illicitly using a Morality Claim as a defeater-deflector.  But is it true?  Here is how one might defend it.  Let RC be the proposition that my color vision are reliable and consider the following:
YY Color Vision Defeater-Defeater Case: You learn that a pill, called ‘YY’, renders unreliable the color vision of ninety-five percent of those who ingest it.  You close your eyes, take the pill, and walk into a room with objects that have no standard color.  For example, there are no bananas or blue jays, but there are plastic bowls, walls, and a chameleon.  You believe both that I’ve ingested YY and P(RC/I’ve ingested YY) is low.  You open your eyes, look at a wall that looks red to you, and believe that it is red.

Both your belief in RC and your belief that the wall is red are defeated.  Furthermore, you can use neither of these beliefs nor any of your beliefs about the colors of objects as defeater-defeaters for your defeater, since they themselves are already defeated by that defeater.  This would be malignant circularity.
	But could you have initially used your beliefs about the colors of the objects as defeater-deflectors?  Could they have stopped the defeater from gaining defeating power?  Consider the following revision of the case:
YY Color Vision Deflector Case: You do not know about YY, and you find yourself in that same room.  You have already formed beliefs that the wall is red, that a bowl is white, and so on.  Then a friend who you know to be a very reliable testifier tells you about YY and that YY was mixed into the dinner you had enjoyed earlier that evening.  You come to believe that I ate YY and that P(RC/I ate YY) is low.

Can you use any of your beliefs about the colors of the objects in the room as defeater-deflectors?  It seems not.  It seems that your beliefs about both RC and the colors of the objects in the room all get defeated in one fell swoop, with none of these beliefs having the power to deflect.  Failure to satisfy the anti-circularity deflector principle explains why your beliefs about the colors of the objects fail as defeater-deflectors, since these color beliefs are produced by your color vision.​[24]​
Contrast this with a case in which, earlier in the day, a known, trustworthy scientist had told you, ‘I’ve tested your physiology and YY will have no effect on you.’  Later in the day, when the person tells you that YY was mixed into your dinner, you would come to believe that P(Rc/I took YY) is low, but you also accept that P(Rc/I took YY & the reliable scientist told me that the YY will have no effect on me) is high.  In this case, it seems that you do have an admissible defeater-deflector.  But we can see that this case is not ruled out by the anti-circularity deflector principle since belief in the deflector was produced by testimony, not color vision.

4.2 The Principle is False
I now argue that the anti-circularity deflector principle is false, and so the charge of question begging fails.  Above, I presented some cases to show that there was an important difference between defeater-defeaters and defeater-deflectors.  From section 2.1,
XX Pill Case: You learn that a pill, called ‘XX’, destroys the cognitive reliability of ninety-five percent of those who ingest it.  You take the pill and come to believe both that I’ve ingested XX and P(R/I’ve ingested XX) is low.

Intuitively, in this case, you gain a defeater for R.  In section 2.3, I introduced the following case,
XX Deflector Case: All is as in the original pill case, except that before I took the pill, a scientist I know to be trustworthy had informed me that I am one of the 5% who is immune to the drug.  I then take the pill while believing that I am one of the immune 5% and P(R/I’ve ingested XX and I am one of the immune 5%) is high.

R is about all of one’s cognitive faculties, so the anti-circularity deflector principle allows no proposition to be a defeater-deflector for it.  But this seems implausible.  In this case, my belief that I am one of the immune 5% seems to be an admissible defeater-deflector for the potential defeater, I’ve ingested XX and P(R/I’ve ingested XX) is low.  The latter proposition would never gain defeating power in the first place, and R is protected from defeat.  Hence, the anti-circularity deflector principle is false.
	One might challenge the intuitions I am appealing to.  One might think that, in the XX Deflector Case, I do receive a defeater.​[25]​ But consider that throughout the whole process, I never once gain a reason to doubt R.  Consider three distinct times:
T1: I have not yet ingested XX.  I have only learned about the existence and properties of XX and that I am one of the immune 5%.  It seems that I don't have a defeater for R.
T2: I ingest XX and come to believe that I took a drug that I am immune to.  It seems that I still gain no defeater for R.
T3: After ingesting XX, I continue to consciously believe that I took a drug that I am immune to.  Again, this is no reason to give up belief in R.

It is very odd to think that believing that one took a drug that one is immune to could give one a defeater for R.
Now suppose that, later on after T3, I lost the belief (due to cognitive decline) that I am one of the immune 5%, but I did continue to believe that I took a drug that 95% of the population is vulnerable to.  Then I would clearly get a defeater because I would no longer have the deflector.  But so long as I continue to consciously believe that I am one of the immune 5%, it seems that the belief continues to have its deflecting powers.  So, the possibility of my description of what goes on at T3 is sufficient to provide a counterexample to the anti-circularity deflector principle.​[26]​
	This leaves us with an important question.  Is the moral realist who is considering EMDA more like the person in the XX Deflector Case or the YY Color Vision Deflector Case?  I do not know.  I will record my suspicion that it feels like the moral realist is more like the person in the YY Color Vision Deflector Case, where deflection fails.  However, at this point, I cannot justify this.  Justifying one way or another would require further work on the conditionalization problem. 

5. Conclusion
Both the EAAN and EMDA literatures face the question, ‘Which beliefs may one use to respond to a potential defeater?’ I have argued that if one’s belief that X is reliable has an actual defeater, then one may not use a deliverance of X as either a defeater-defeater or as a means to gaining a benign epistemically circular belief that X is reliable.  The more difficult question is in the case that one’s belief that X is reliable has only a potential defeater.  May one use a deliverance of X as a defeater-deflector?  The third-factor response affirms that sometimes, one may; the charge of question begging affirms that one may not.  The underlying claim in dispute is the anti-circularity deflector principle.
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^12	  I thank a referee for pushing me to address this question.
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^16	  One might formulate this premise so that it only states that the probability is merely inscrutable.  Vavova (2015, 105–106) notes that this would make EMDAs less interesting because it would make it too much like a standard skeptical argument, to which one could make standard skeptical responses.  I will follow her lead in stating the premise as claiming a low probability.  Thanks to a referee for pressing me to address this point.
^17	  See the references in footnote 15.
^18	  For example, see van Cleve (1984), Alston (1989, 319–349), Plantinga (2002, 241–242), Pryor (2004), Markie (2005), Bergmann (2002, 76–82; 2004; 2006, 179–211), and Sosa (2009).
^19	  This paragraph contained a very cursory presentation of an argument for the possibility of benign epistemic circularity by Bergmann, which is developed in more detail in his (2006, 206–211).  Here is an additional reason in its favor.  Consider Plantinga’s (1996, 342) point that not even God could know that God’s own faculties are reliable in a noncircular way.  Hence, if it is even just metaphysically possible that there is a God (or just a plain omniscient being) – and this does seem possible – then it is possible for there to be benign circularity.  For more defenses of benign epistemic circularity, see the references in the previous footnote.
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^25	  Thanks to Tristram McPherson for pressing me on this, and to Philip Swenson and Declan Smithies for helpful discussion.
^26	  But suppose that, the next morning, I wake up and the belief that I took a drug that renders 95% of the population cognitively unreliable is what first comes to mind (it is conscious) and my belief that I am one of the immune 5% remains unconscious. (I just happen to think of the former belief first.) What happens here?  I am pulled in two directions.  On the one hand, I am inclined to think that the unconscious belief still has deflecting powers, despite its being unconscious.  On the other hand, I am inclined to think that if what is conscious is that I ingested a pill that renders 95% of people’s faculties unreliable, then this gives me a defeater for R, and hence, for all my beliefs.  Hence, when the unconscious belief that I am one of the immune 5% once again becomes conscious, it is already defeated and stripped of its deflecting powers.  Which direction is right?  Settling this dispute requires resolving the dispute between strong internalists (those who think that only present, conscious states are justificationally relevant) and moderate internalists (those who think that unconscious states can also be justificationally relevant).  See Moon (2012) for in-depth discussion of this dispute.  Thanks to Dustin Locke for the initial case and to both him and Declan Smithies for helpful conversation.
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